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Operational Leadership: A Case of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger)
Operational leadership is of critical importance to the military, especially in times of warfare, but it is a difficult to define; and it is even more difficult to describe the essential characteristics of a successful operational commander. What works in peacetime does not necessarily work in wartime. However, the writings on the subject of leadership always include four traits which we can deduce as the essential characteristics of all successful operational leaders. The four essential traits are: boldness, perseverance, flexibility and decisiveness.
Using the operational leadership of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger) as a case study, we can review the significance of these four traits to his operational leadership.
Preface
In time of war the operational commander is the nexus at which national strategy and policy intersect with the capabilities of the military organization, and upon the operational commander's shoulders rests the primary responsibility for success or failure of the nation's war plans. The great operational commander is able to bear the weight of this responsibility, in victory or in defeat, by drawing on strength of character that most of us do not possess.
When this weight is placed on the shoulders of a commander not suited for such a burden, he will eventually collapse under the pressure.
There is a significant difference between wartime and peacetime operational leadership. The primary responsibility of the wartime leader is to plan, prepare, and conduct campaigns and major operations, and specifically to "conduct the estimate of the situation and make decisions," 1 normally under duress, requiring prior experience and significant operational expertise. The peacetime operational commander is responsible more for administrative and management tasks such as recruiting, training, budgeting, acquisition, and supply and planning, for which organizational, administrative and diplomatic skills are more appropriate.
Unfortunately operational commanders who are selected based on their qualifications for leadership in peacetime often make poor wartime leaders, and vice versa. It is a mistake to assume that the outstanding peacetime military leader will de facto be adequate as a wartime operational commander.
The objective of this paper is to analyze what specific traits of the operational commander are most critical to success in wartime and show that their impact affects the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The main focus will be analyzing the operational leadership characteristics of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger) in his execution of the Schlieffen Plan; and to draw conclusions about the impact that his personal characteristics had on his degree of success as an operational commander.
I. Theoretical Framework
The operational commander's job is to translate national military strategy into a coherent operational plan capable of being carried out by the military. To accomplish this he needs intelligence and creativity, as well as professional training and experience, and a thorough understanding and appreciation of the capabilities of the military forces and the objectives of national strategy and policy. He also must be a leader.
Effective leadership is easy to recognize, but difficult to define. As General George S.
Patton, Jr., once commented, "Leadership is the thing that wins battles. I have it-but I'll be damned if I can define it." 2 Despite the elusive nature of leadership, most experts are agreed on certain basic qualities of the operational commander. These include boldness, courage, perseverance, creativity, professional knowledge, decisiveness, flexibility, good judgment, and high intellect. Although each of these qualities is important to the success of the operational commander in wartime, the presence or absence of four of these qualitiesboldness, perseverance, flexibility and decisiveness-seem to make or break wartime leaders more assuredly than any of the other factors. Combined, these four elements of leadership comprise an individual's strength of character, which Napoleon I called, "the most essential quality of a general…." 3 The most successful operational commanders intuitively incorporate these traits in the design and execution of their plans.
Boldness. Boldness is the first prerequisite for military greatness 4 ; the operational commander is caught in a struggle between using the audacity he knows will succeed, and the measured caution he has acquired from years of experience. If he is able to retain his sense of daring and incorporate it into his war plans, he who will have the advantage, for "whenever boldness encounters timidity, it is likely to be the winner." 5 Boldness seems to be a natural rather than acquired personality trait, for "No man who is not born bold can play such a role."
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Perseverance. Perseverance is the determination to carry through an action despite the pressures urging against it. The quality of perseverance must be based on the operational commander's confidence in his own knowledge and judgment. When this self-confidence wanes, so does perseverance. Perseverance is most critical to the operational commander in the execution of a major operation or campaign, when he is bombarded by conflicting information, as well as by the fog and friction of war. Under these circumstances, the operational commander who doubts his own ability to design a plan that is sound and realistic will surrender to his emotional responses and lose confidence either in his plan or in his own judgment. Perseverance does not equate to obstinacy. An operational commander will be able to persevere if he is confident that the plan he developed for achieving an objective is realistic and achievable, despite the set-backs he encounters in the actual execution of the plan. Perseverance can only be taught to the degree that leaders are given the chance to practice making plans, and then carry them out. In so doing, the leaders of tomorrow reinforce their confidence in their own judgment and ability. 
II. Historical Framework
Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke, known as von Moltke (The Younger) to distinguish him from his famous uncle, was born in 1848 in Gersdorff, Mecklenburg in the north of Germany. The mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were an era of social change.
Leadership of the military, which had been the sole province of European aristocracy until this point, was giving way to the professional soldier whose promotion was awarded based on merit rather than social status. Von Moltke (The Younger) was of the latter category, promoted more because of his social standing than his performance and qualifications as a military leader.
Being named for Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (The Elder), was a heavy burden for the nephew who adored his erudite uncle, but lacked the military genius for which his family was most renown. He seemed always to be in his uncle's shadow, never able to live up to the famous von Moltke name. Growing up with daily reminders of one's inadequacy will cause most people to doubt not only their self-confidence, but also their self-worth. These feelings haunted the younger von Moltke throughout his life and were a source of great anguish for him, especially in his generalship of the opening days of World War I.
Moltke was an intelligent, pleasant, reflective man, the latter of which traits, Napoleon I ascribed to a man who "would not be able to carry through [a] concept with the singleminded vigor and boldness that were the essential…. Moltke's inadequacies, among which were laziness, lack of self-confidence, lethargy and his inclination to be bogged down in details. Von Moltke was also opposed by his military peers who were suspicious of the paunchy, artistic general who played the cello, and kept falling off his horse in front of the troops. 12 In all, it can be surmised that von Moltke was far less qualified for the job of Chief of the Great General Staff than those he was selected over.
III. The Schlieffen Plan
As Chief of the Great General Staff, von Moltke inherited the 1905 Schlieffen Plan, the war plan developed by his predecessor as the primary strategy for attaining Germany's objective of hegemony in Europe. To achieve hegemony, German had to defeat its greatest rival, France. Knowing that Russia would attack Germany's eastern flank if a war broke out with France, and realizing that they could not win a two-front war, Count von Schlieffen, France. The sheer boldness of the plan was its primary strength, since the German forces
were not sufficiently superior in number to fight and win a two-front war. Schlieffen was adamant that the right flank forces not be weakened in order for the boldness of the plan to work. "Such risks required iron nerve on the part of the Plan's executor," 14 to be successful.
Unfortunately for Germany, the Kaiser had selected Moltke to execute the plan.
It is pertinent to note that the Schlieffen Plan had a number of erroneous assumptions, including the use of forces that were not actually in being, marching down roads that didn't exist, and meeting railroad timetables with no concern for the fog or friction of war. The plan left no room for error. 15 Schlieffen and the General Staff based the plan on a number of erroneous assumptions which might well have resulted in failure of the plan. They assumed Belgium would offer little protest or resistance to German troops invading their territory and England would remain neutral. They also assumed that Russia would take at least six weeks to mobilize in the east, 16 giving them the time they needed to first defeat France with a quick, decisive victory.
IV. The Opening Days of World War I
As Chief of the Great General Staff from 1906 to 1914, Moltke became convinced that a major confrontation between the European powers was inevitable. He believed the conflict would not be solved by the single decisive battle for which the Schlieffen Plan was developed, but rather would, "become a long, exhausting struggle against a country that will not admit defeat until the whole strength of its people is broken. Had von Moltke had the courage of his convictions that the imminent conflict was to be a protracted war, he would more logically have cautioned against using the Schlieffen Plan at all. Rather than simply bowing to the greater military knowledge of his predecessor, he should have proposed that Germany adopt a defensive strategy against a two-front war. But the societal and political climate and the inflexible nature of mobilization plans would have been a formidable hurdle to leap over, and von Moltke's own self-doubt and in-bred caution blinded him to the possibility that he could and should propose an alternative plan for
Germany. Yet, even had he proposed a defensive strategy, the Kaiser's irrational hopes for German hegemony in Europe would have spelled doomed for any other proposal.
V. Fog and Friction
General von Moltke's operational leadership in the critical opening days of World War I lacked boldness and decisiveness, and was also characterized by inflexibility. Insecure in his own knowledge and abilities, his leadership failures resulted in inadequate, untimely and unclear decisions during the critical first days of the war that contributed significantly to the loss of the war for Germany. General von Moltke had committed his first critical error-thinking that the quick, decisive victory had already been won. Believing the campaign in France to be a fait accompli, General von Moltke made his second grievous error by succumbing to the pressure for more troops at the eastern front to counter the Russians who had mobilized more quickly than expected, and were already invading East Prussia. Thinking the campaign in the west to be won, General von Moltke decided to move two corps from the western front to reinforce the Eighth Army on the eastern front at Tannenberg. Apart from the obvious oversight that these two corps could not reach Tannenberg in time to make a difference where they weren't really needed, General von Moltke's more significant misjudgment was in taking away forces from the right flank of the Schlieffen Plan which less than a month later might have meant the difference between victory and defeat at the Battle of the Marne.
Both Schlieffen and Moltke agreed that invasion of France through
VI. Chaos
Despite the perceived victory at Mons, "Gloomy Julius", as the Kaiser playfully referred to von Moltke to describe his perennially pessimistic outlook, could not celebrate for long.
On the eastern front the breakdown in communications and the overly cautious leadership of Lieutenant General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, commander of the Eighth Army, presaged the loss of East Prussia to the Russians. Oppressively worried about both the western and now the eastern front, Moltke was at an emotional breaking point.
Communications breakdown between his Army commanders and the Supreme Army
Headquarters led the Army commanders to begin making uncoordinated troop movements.
The lack of unity of effort presented France with their opportunity for victory, which General
Joffre was quick to exploit. Even still, General Moltke continued to be distracted. The details of the western front, his skepticism over the French retreat, the unforeseen difficulties in repairing the demolished railroad system which thus impacted the re-supply of his forward-deployed troops, the constant struggle for power between his generals, the poor communications on both fronts, all weighed down the already disheartened operational commander, causing him to lose all confidence in his own judgment, and making him even more cautious and indecisive. General Moltke knew that he was not qualified to be Chief of the Great German Staff.
He lacked self-confidence, primarily because of the insecurity he had felt from a lifetime of living in the shadow of his famous uncle, but also because he was "too reflective" as he himself said. He was inexperienced in operational matters and believed he was not qualified to make the decisions for which he was called upon to make. The inflexibility of the Schlieffen Pl an was compounded by Moltke's own inability to see alternate ways of solving the problem. Moltke relied so heavily on the accuracy of his war plan that he was not able to make appropriate changes when the plan no longer worked.
When Russia began attacking East Prussia before the Germany had secured victory over Moltke's lack of decisiveness was a classic example of why the insecure, overly reflective man cannot be an effective operational commander. When communications broke down between Supreme Army Headquarters and the generals on the eastern and western fronts, Moltke fell into a panic. His reflective and pensive mind required an infusion of information, and time to absorb the situation and mull over the options before making a decision. Lacking sufficient amounts of information, Moltke did not have enough confidence in his own judgment to make a decision, right or wrong. Needing a decision either one way or the other, the field commanders began making their own decisions. The uncoordinated movements of the various armies on both the eastern and western fronts created vulnerabilities in their defenses which the opposing forces were able to exploit to their advantage and ultimate victory over the German armies.
Lessons Learned
The importance of picking the right operational commander for the job is crucial to the success of the campaign. The individual who is inherently cautious and overly reflective will not be successful as a leader in the high-stress, quick-response situations of combat. The 
